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In this essay, I would like to present a logical problem 
with the idea, evident in the writing of Geshe Rabten and 
Keiji Nishitani, of an innate human tendency towards 
.substantializationand objectification, which they oftenspeak 
of as being an "instinctual" characteristic of human exist­
ence. The problem, specifically, is this: how can Buddhism 
claim that humans have an innate tendency towards incor­
rectly imputing permanence and a positive essence to the 
world, while at the same time maintaining that humans have 
no innate qualities at all? I am not claiming the problem to be 
in any way unconquerable; on the contrary, I hope that an 
attempt at solving it may serve as a means bywhich to clarify 
a realm of Buddhist thought which is difficult to talk about 
even in its most clear moments. First, I would like to define 
the problem itself as it comes up in the writings of Rabten and 
Nishitani; then I would like to defend the idea that such an 
nmate tendency might exist as such, by making recourse to 
the nature of our perception and our language as humans. 
Finally, I would like to present what is more likely to be the 
correct analysis of the concepts, emptying the clanns madeby 
Nishitani to the level at which he most likely intended them. 
We begin, then by stating the question: Why do we 
substantialize? The initial answer to this question, which 
seems to me at first terribly unsatisfying to the philosopher, 
is thatitis our IIdestinyll. We are bound to read substanceand 
permanence into our world, according to Buddhism, by the 
very nature of the universe and the nature of our minds. In 
the Buddhist literature in general, there seems to be a tacit 
acceptance of this problem as a general human defect, espe­
cially in relation to the question of why people need to be 
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enlightened. Of course, the fact of the matter is that enlight­
ened people are in the extreme minority compared to those 
suffering in samsara, so whether or not it truly is an inborn 
human fault, it is the prevalent state for the majority of 
human existence. But why then make these strong claims, 
especially in light of the empty nature of human existence? 
Before we can answer, let us actually look at some of these 
claims. 
In his book Echoes of Voidness, Geshe Rabten comes to 
this point as a part of his analysis of the "Heart of Wisdom 
Sutra". Although all things arise dependently, he says, we 
must realize that: 
All things instinctively appear to us as though they 
did exist independently, as though they were en­
dowed with their own autonomous self-existence. 
Take for example a mountain. From its own side, it 
seems to have an inherent substantiality and mas­
siveness independent of all conditions. It stands 
there against us: imposing, independent and con­
crete. But upon reflection we shall slowly become 
aware that this mountain depends for its existence 
upon a variety of causes and conditions [ ... ] (Rabten 
30) 
Again, he comes close to this subject when talking about the 
selflessness of phenomena. He makes a clever analogy, 
comparing the unenlightened person to someone with a 
cataract,who sees things that are not there. In the same way, 
people who are in samsara naturally see substance which is 
not there: 
Because bewilderment obstructs one from seeing the 
nature of phenomena, it is said to be deceived. And 
the Mighty One taught that whatever objects are 
artificially affected by it and thus appear to be true are 
deceptive, Le. conventional truths. For those who 
have abandoned the apprehension of inherent exist­
ence, however, things which are so artificially af­
fected are seen as merely deceptive but not as 
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true.(Rabten 58) 
Rabten does not question why this is the case, but merely 
makes the comparison. Reality is simply not what it seems to 
be to the unenlightened mind. Although as humanbeingswe 
are equippedwith eyes, ears, andminds capable of accepting 
and sorting the ambulating mountains of sense data we 
constantly take in, the picture weput together is not a true one, 
because we see the world as containing objects and sub­
stance, of having an essence of positive being. To the Bud­
dhistway ofthinking, this positive being is notwhatwe think 
it is; it is merely empty appearance, and it is our mistake to 
think (as we all do) that the story ends there. We are 
constantly betrayed by our perceptions and mental imputa­
tions of the world, just as someone with a cataract is betrayed 
into thinking he sees hairs where there are no hairs. This 
comparison might lead us to believe that Rabten sees the 
substantializing impulse in the unenlightened mind as a 
quasi-p hysical manifestation, owing its existence to nature or 
dharma or dependent arising in the way he would speak of 
any other physical characteristic. On the other hand, how­
ever, keep in mind that he makes the above statement in the 
course of proving that the self and all things are essentially 
empty and cannot have intrinsic characteristics. Is this a 
contradiction, or is there something we are not yet seeing? 
Let us push forward and attempt to glean more from other 
arguments. 
Keiji Nishitani makes reference to the concept of an 
inherentobjectifying tendency at several points. Inhis analy­
sis, he grapples with this problem, and attempts several 
versions of qualification or explanation. In the course of his 
discussion on Kant and the "old metaphysics", he says: 
The problem of the thing-in-itself developed, in fact, 
from the presupposition of [an objective, representa­
tional point of view] as a constant base. To view 
things as objects is, after all, to grasp things on the 
field of consciousness, under the Form they display 
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insofar as they unveil themselves to us. In that case, 
as a matter of course, all objects are received as 
representations.(Nishitani 133) 
He here identifies consciousness as the agent of extortion by 
which we are forced to see everything as representationat 
objective, and filled with positive essence. He criticizes Kant 
in that despite his belief in the Copernican revolution, he is 
still operating from the same base as those Western metaphy­
sicians (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc.) who preceded him. 
Namely, he is still framing the world around him in terms of 
subjects and objects, and merely removing the II real" objects 
by a step and calling themnoumena, leaVing us only with the 
phenomena we ourselves force onto the world, as a frontis­
piece for the elusive noumena of which we can have no 
experience. Nishitani, in this instance, says that as long as we 
function on the field of consciousness, we will necessarily be 
caught in the subject object distinction. Although he does not 
finish the connection in this passage, the next logical step is 
to realize that insofar as consciousness is a normal, universal 
facet of humanexistence, our tendency to objectify is brought 
once more to the level of instinct. In other places he refers to 
this tendency as the" essential attachment to things that lurks 
in the essence of consciousness" and our LI orientation to 
know objects and relate to them as [subjective]" (Nishitani 
151, 155). He also ties the idea to the Buddhist word avidya 
(Uthe darkness of ignorance") in which the self, because it 
must impute permanence, positive being, and essence to 
things, remains"opaque and not yet penetrated to its core" 
(Nishitani 204). This lack of clarity seems to be a stumbling 
block which is as much a part of being human as seeing or 
hearingat all. "In fact," he says of avidya, II this state of affairs 
is the constant companion of history, following it around like 
a shadow" (Nishitani 204). Here and elsewhere, we see 
Nishitani is in fact making a claim about the breadth and 
depth of this tendency towards substantialization in human 
Existenz. 
In taking a step back from this stream of thought, we see 
what the obvious objection is, which was mentioned above. 
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If, according to the Buddhist standpoint, we are essentially 
empty in the manner of sunyata, how can we then speak of 
anything as being our destiny? Using the term destiny 
connotes many things which are directly opposed to the 
entire concept of sunyata, in that IIdestiny" is something 
inevitable and predetermined, or moreover beyond human 
power or control. Is this truly the claim that is being made of 
our tendency to objectify the world? Would it not have been 
better to use another vocabulary in this case, such as speaking 
in terms of "necessity" or "compulsion" perhaps? Ifwe are 
going to maintain on the one hand that all appearances are 
empty of substance and essence, but on the other that our 
minds (empty though they be) have a characteristic which is 
enduring, specifically that all humans, by their very nature, 
tend towards objectification and substantialization, then we 
have some reconciling to do. 
In the next section of this essay, I would like to defend this 
prospect as well as possible, to see if it has merit despite its 
obvious tension with the concept of the emptiness and void­
ness of all things. I would offer two initial solutions, one more 
satisfying than the other, but both worthy of discussion. To 
say that it is our destiny or instinct to make the world into a 
permanent and objectified substance is basically to say that 
this action has its origin in some aspect of our nature. What 
are two facets of our material existence in the world that 
relate to this? Our physical sensation and perception of the 
world, and our language. Let us deal with each of these sides 
separa tely. 
In the course of his discussion on the knowing of 110t­
knowing, Nishitani says that "not even the so-called subject, 
but even the body is an apparition of selfness" (Nishitani 
156). Our consciousness is very much linked to ourbody, and 
our body has limitations. Our survival in the world, at the 
most basic level, is dependent upon ourability to perceive the 
physical nature of the world around us. Ifwe are lacking in 
the areas of sensation or perception, it is simply a fact that we 
will not live long enough to consider the questions of.our 
essential nature in the first place. (Whether or not it is 
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essentially empty on the field of sunyata, the delivery truck 
coming down the street at 60 miles per hour will kill us ifwe 
choose to interfere with it.) Psychological research tells us 
that inour systemof perception, we have manylittle"trickslf 
which tend to aid us in the process of taking a large, complex 
field of input (our vision, for example) and delineating it into 
discrete meaningful areas, such as foreground and back­
ground, near and far, up and down, etc. It isbymeans of these 
perceptive tricks that we are quickly able to determine how 
distant the truck is and howfast it is moving, even thoughwe 
are only actually seeing blotches of color moving past each 
other. This ability is so engrained in our perceptive abilities 
thatwe rarelysee these perceptive tricks occurring, and ifwe 
do, it is only in the case of an optical illusion or other unusual 
circumstance. 
My point is this, that if suchmechanisms are known to be 
inplace inas simplea realmas ourvisual perception, so much 
more can we assume they exist in the realm of our mental 
framing of the world. This is the realmof phenomenology, of 
course. So perhaps we can say that Nishitani uses the word 
1/ destiny" in his writing to connote the idea that we are 
originally oriented in such a way as to impute substantiality 
in the things around us, in that it helps us to survive physi­
cally. Going back to the Rabten analogy of the cataract, 
perhaps it would be better to compare our predestined 
substantializing tendency to something like a person who 
sees an optical illusion. Take the following picture, for 
example: 
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The two squares in the center are exactly the same size. 
However, the white center square on the right seems bigger 
than the black center square on the left because our eyes tend 
to expand white on black, and decrease black on white. This 
is a defect, in that it prevents us from seeing what is actually 
the case. But unlike the cataract, we do not simply dismiss 
this error as a type of disease. More like the "destiny" 
Nishitani speaks of, this example shows a tendency to sub­
stantialize that is a part of being human, at least insofar as we 
understand being human. This example is preferable to the 
example of someone with a cataract (at least, it is ifwe want 
to maintain that this substantializing tendency is instinctual) 
because the cataract is a disease which developed over time, 
whereas the perceptual illusion seems to be common to all 
people regardless of their background. 
The other possibility by which we can explain this"des­
tiny" is thatperhaps Buddhism labels this problem as instinc­
tual or destiny-bound because it has to do with 
representationality, which is central to the nature of language, 
which is in turn all-important to our humanity. Language is 
our mode of understanding everything, as well as the only 
bridge connecting us and others. Language functions, to be 
criminally simple, by establishing metaphorical relation­
ships between symbols (words) and corresponding objects or 
concepts. Implicit in this relationship is the fact that words 
mean something; they mean some thing, and /I thing" in this 
case easily slips to meansome objective, essential, substantial 
thing which is heavy and solid with its own being. To say 
"apple" already has the effect of pinning down apple as a 
solid object, capable of holding its ground against the on­
slaughts of nihility. To say "love" marks love as something 
which we can talk about, and in turn, some thing to which 
characteristics can belong; which can exist or not exist and be 
authentically objective ih either case. Perhaps to find a 
problem with Nishitani's use of fhe word"destiny" is to miss 
the fundamental point that language has the effect of pinning 
us to substantiality (and pinning substantiality to us) in a 
nearly inescapable way. 
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To this second idea, the Buddhist might object, citing that 
in enlightenment, what has happened is not that we stop 
using words; we continue to speak and write, but we some­
how manage to avoid doing it in a substantializing way. 
Apple becomes apple2, and love becomes love2, in the man­
ner of conventional truth, meaning that we speak now relat­
ing to things in their appearance (knowing that they are only 
appearances, but also that in the appearance lies the very 
fullness of essence). Language is therefore not the culprit, or 
at least, not a reason to be using the word /Idestiny" . 
As a matter of fact, this same objection can be applied to 
the first solution I offered to our problem, that of physical 
perception leading us into a broader fonn of substantializing. 
If it is the case that we have the ability to escape these 
problems, why are they born into us? Could itnot be the case 
that a baby is born who might learn to perceive and use 
language in a non-essential way? After all, enlightened 
monks cando it, and they are only human. Whatis on the line 
here is the question of nurture versus nature, albeit in a more 
in-depthway than the usual debate: are we naturally born to 
substantialize the world, or is it something we learn as we 
grow up? If Buddhism is going to maintain that it is inborn 
and unalterable at that level, how can they still claim that 
human existence is essentially empty? If on the other hand, 
they hold that yes, human existence is empty and has no 
inherent qualities, they must admit that the objectifying 
impulse is learned and not an innate characteristic we pos­
sess.1 It is a sticky situation we have put ourselves innow, but 
perhaps we can be aided by a discussion of Nishitani' s earlier 
in his chapter. 
One clue we have which may help defend Nishitani 
against the contradictions raised above comes in his discus­
sion of the historicity of self-centeredness. Citing Arnold 
Toynbee, he explains that what we may actually be looking 
at is, in part, a mode of self-centeredness. Western history, 
starting with Israel as God's /Ichosen people", is a goal­
oriented, directional history, and as such naturally empha­
sizes the "master" side of the master-sive-slave relationship 
of circuminsessional interpenetration. It tends to put us as 
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the players on the stage of life, as Shakespeare has quoth, and 
thus the center of it all. We become subject, all else becomes 
object: "Given this standpoint, the self-centeredness of mall 
casts its shadowover everything. Trying to elude this shadow 
is in vain" (Nishitani 203). 
This is the problemj what is the solution? The talk of this 
tendency being "innate" can only go so far, and Nishitani's 
pointinbringing it up is to make it clear to us thatBuddhism's 
radical emptiness is in fact the only cure for the disease: liThe 
Buddhaic mode of thought has one distinct advantage over 
the Western mode: the former contains the possibility of 
going beyond the self-centeredness that is innate not only in 
man but in all living things" (Nishitani202). Aha! Here we 
see two things. First, his most candid admission of the basic 
problem discussed in this paper: ••• the self-centeredness 1/ 
that is innate not only in man but in all living things." If not 
for the context of this statement, we would have to say that 
Nishitani has allowed just enough rope to hang his self of no­
self. However, the escape is evident in this statement. Bud­
dhism, and the standpoint of sunyata, gives us the only"out" 
from what is otherwise an innate tendency, by making us 
understand that it is "innate" only insofar as any conditional 
truth can be innate. On the level of ultimate truth, however, 
it is just as empty as our need to breathe or eat. On the field 
of rationality, it is a logical problem. The field of sunyata, on 
the other hand, transcends the field of logic, and therefore 
does not need to worry about this contradiction as a problem. 
Going more in-depth into this idea, we come to see that 
our "problem" is no problem at all, but rather it is at most a 
careless choice of language. The tendency to objectify is part 
and parcel of the substantial mode of thinking which traps us 
all until we become enlightened, but that is not at all to say 
thatitis our home-ground. Nihility opens up in our lives not 
as something external, but as coextant with life itself, and in 
embracing this nihility, we become truly ourselves for the 
first time, and "take leave of the essential attachment to 
things that lurks in the essence of consciousness andby virtue 
of which we get caught in the grasp of things in trying to 
grasp them in an objective, representational manner" 
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(Nishitani 151). In enlightenment, our vain attachment to 
things is exchanged for a new relation to things as primal 
facts, and it is this relationship which is ourmost fundamen­
tal mode of being, not our attachment to things in the realm 
of samsara. In the war between the 1/destiny" of this errone­
ous tendency and the clearing 1/force" of sunyata, we see the 
struggle of where to locate ourprimal, basic ontology: either 
in permanence and absolute being on the one hand, or in 
impermanence, negativity, and emptiness onthe other. Bud­
dhismholds the latter to be the most basic, and Iwould argue 
that as long as writers persist in calling the substantializing 
tendency by the misnomer of "destiny", Buddhism is only 
hurting its own project. 
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NOTES 
1 In this case, I would think that it should be one of the goals of Buddhism 
to change the world in this respect, so that right from birth we attempt to 
keep children from substantializing the world in perception and language, 
rather than accepting the fact that each human being must endure a youth 
of learning to substantialize everything, only then to turn around and 
unlearn what was learned. 
